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ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-Electric Utility Rate Regulation: Regulat­
ing the Shock: Abandonment of Nuclear Power Plant Construction­
Attorney General v. Department ofPublic Utilities, 390 Mass. 208, 455 
N.E. 2d 414 (1983). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1981, ten years after they had initiated the Pilgrim II nuclear 
power plant project, I Boston Edison Company's Board of Directors 
voted to abandon all efforts to build it. 2 
On October 16, 1981, Boston Edison Company (Edison) filed a 
revised rate schedule3 with the Massachusetts Department of Public 
1. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 433 (Mass. Dep't of 
Pub. Util. 1982). Edison initially intended the Pilgrim II facility to fulfill a forecasted 
growth in demand for electricity. When this estimated growth did not materialize, the 
incentive shifted to reducing Edison's 65% dependence upon oil for the production of elec­
tricity. Boston Edison Co., D.P.U. Order No. 19494, at 191 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 
September 22, 1981). 
2. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 390 Mass. 208, 210, 455 N.E.2d 414, 
415 (1983). Edison asserted that the accident at Three Mile Island caused the regulatory 
delay in licensing Edison to build Pilgrim II and that the delay led to the cancellation. 
Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 449 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 
1982). It recognized licensing delays as a factor. It also cited the company's inability to 
finance the project to completion as a cause of abandonment. Id. at 470. 
3. In Massachusetts, public utilities may obtain an increase in the amount recovered 
from retail ratepayers by filing a revised schedule of rates with the Massachusetts Depart­
ment of Public Utilities. After a public utility proposes an increase, the Department must 
hold a public hearing and examine the advisability of the increase. Pursuant to its ratemak­
ing authority, the Department may delay effectiveness of the proposed prices no longer 
than ten months from the earliest date on which the new amount might otherwise become 
effective. The Department incorporates any required changes into the schedule. MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 94 (West 1976). 
Within the scope of public utility ratemaking, two distinct areas exist in which the 
Department makes binding judgments. The first deals with the total amount recoverable 
from the ratepayers. The second involves the allocation of the amount among different 
classes of users - residential, commercial and industrial - usually on the basis of the cost 
of service to each class. See Jones, Judicial Determination 0/ Public Utility Rates: A Cri­
tique, 54 B.U.L. REV. 873, 875 (1974). This note focuses on the first area only because of 
the two step process of decisionmaking. Once the regulatory agency allows recovery of 
nuclear power plant abandonment losses, the agency combines the recoverable amount 
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Utilities (Department).4 Edison hoped to recoup its net investment, 
estimated at $278.3 million, in the Pilgrim II nuclear power plant pro­
ject through the rate increase. 5 
On April 30, 1982, the Department decided to allow Edison to 
recover a portion of its total abandonment losses6 through an increase 
in rates as a cost of providing electricity. 7 Each year for thirteen years 
beginning May 1, 1982, Edison's ratepayers will pay $12,500,000.00 
more for their electricity than if Edison had never begun the Pilgrim II 
project.8 
The Massachusetts Attorney General appealed the Department's 
decision,9 asserting that the Department did not have the authority to 
with other sources of increase; only then does the agency allocate the burden of this total 
amount among the ratepayers. Id. 
4. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 390 Mass. 208, 210, 455 N.E.2d 414, 
415 (1983). 
5. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 PUb. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 434 n.77 (Mass. 
Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982). 
Edison joined with other electric companies in Massachusetts, Maine, New Hamp­
shire, and Vermont in its endeavor to build Pilgrim II. The $278.3 million, therefore, rep­
resents only a part of the abandonment losses. Edison was the major participant with an 
intended ownership of 59 per cent. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 390 Mass. 
208,210 n.2, 455 N.E.2d 414, 415 n.2 (1983). See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. 
Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 433 n.75 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982) for a complete list of 
participant companies. 
6. Investment in research, forecasting, engineering plans, licensing expenses, and the 
costs of cancelling contracts for the purchase of fabrication materials represented the losses 
of abandonment. Edison never began construction, however, if such term is defined as 
groundbreaking and actual fabrication at the intended site. Telephone interview with R. K. 
Gad III, Counsel for Boston Edison Co. (Nov. 23, 1983). Contra MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 164, § 69G (West 1976 & West Supp. 1984) (defining "construction"); Plymouth 
County Nuclear Information Comm., Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Council, 374 Mass. 
236, 238-41, 372 N.E.2d 229, 231-32 (1978). 
7. See infra notes 24 & 29 and accompanying text. 
As a result, Edison will recover $162.5 million from its ratepayers rather than the 
$278.3 million it requested. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 
431,473-74 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982). The total will be allocated among Edison's 
550,000 customers over 13 years. Boston Globe, May I, 1982, at I, co!.l. 
Edison proposed either a one-time recovery or one over a shorter period of time. The 
Department rejected Edison's proposal to avoid placing a severe burden on the ratepayers, 
while allowing Edison to recover such a large amount through its rates. In Re Boston 
Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 472-73 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982). 
8. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 390 Mass. 208, 210, 455 N.E.2d 414, 
416 (1983). 
9. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 390 Mass. 222, 455 N.E.2d 
414,421(1983). 
Statutory authority allows the Attorney General to intervene in all Department pro­
ceedings on behalf of any group of consumers. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12, § lIE 
(West Supp. 1984). Thus, he becomes a party in interest to an administrative decision and 
may appeal if aggrieved. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25, § 5 (West 1981). 
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approve rate increases which were to recoup an investment in a plant 
which would never render service. lo In Attorney General v. Depart­
ment of Public Utilities, II the court affirmed the Department's asser­
tion of authority to allow the rate increase. 12 
Generally, Massachusetts regulatory practices prohibit the recov­
ery of investments in new facilities until the public utility completes 
the project,13 Attorney General, however, presented a confiictingl4 sit­
uation because the Department allowed partial recovery when the Pil­
grim II nuclear power plant will never be completed. At a more 
practical level, the problem presented by Attorney General is the reso­
lution of two seemingly opposed interests. The investors and Edison 
wanted to avoid paying for the abandonment losses by reducing or 
eliminating dividends. In contrast, the ratepayers objected to any in­
crease in the cost of electricity which will result in no tangible benefit 
in the future. 
This note examines various regulatory outcomes and policies im­
posed in reaction to the costs associated with nuclear power plant 
abandonment including complete allowance, partial allowance under a 
prudence/imprudence test, and the purported bar of any recovery. 
Further, this note discusses the rationales underlying the Depart­
ment's decision to allow partial recovery as well as the implications of 
Attorney General in light of its probable effect on ratepayers. Finally, 
this note suggests legislation aimed at preventing imprudent costs as 
an amendment to existing Massachusetts statutory law concerning 
electric power plant construction. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Economic and Legal Bases of Rate Regulation 
The status of electric companies as public utilities l5 emanates 
10. Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Util., 390 Mass. 208, 222, 455 N.E.2d 414, 
421 (1983). 
II. 390 Mass. 208, 455 N.E.2d 414 (1983). 
12. Id. at 232, 455 N.E.2d at 427. 
13. Id. at 219, 455 N.E.2d at 420. The Department established this regulatory treat­
ment of construction costs while in progress. The Department bases the deferral on the 
policy decision that present ratepayers should not be charged for the costs of electricity to 
be provided in the future. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 
456-57 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). See also New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Depart­
ment of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443, 454-58, 275 N.E.2d 493,501-03 (1971). See infra note 
24 for the ratemaking definition of "cost." 
14. See infra note 93. 
15. R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES I (1979); C. 
PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 10-11 (1984). 
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from economic and legal theories that conclude that the production 
and distribution of electricity should be subject to regulation. 16 Eco­
nomic theory characterizes electricity producing enterprises as natural 
monopolies under the reasoning that the more electricity a single com­
pany produces, the lower the cost of each additional unit of electricity 
from the company.17 Thus, the objective of efficiency is served if one 
company maintains a monopoly over the supply of electricity in a 
given area. IS A corollary in economic theory holds that the potential 
exists for monopolies to charge whatever price they choose without 
losing consumer demand. Absent regulation, the electric company 
could abuse its position by demanding unreasonably high prices. 19 
In response to the need for regulation, the law compels public 
utilities to accept only reasonable compensation for the service they 
provide and places on them an obligation to provide an adequate sup­
ply of electricity.20 The latter responsibility entails a duty to build new 
facilities to meet increased demands or other business oriented con tin­
gencies.21 By regulating the rates charged by a public utility, the legal 
system seeks to enable the company to implement its two legal 
obligations.22 
In Massachusetts, the Department of Public Utilities performs 
the regulatory function. 23 The Department and all similar regulatory 
agencies employ the guiding principle that the allowed rate be just and 
reasonable.24 As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the 
16. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT, 
AND OWNERSHIP 18-22 (1973). 
17. Id. The necessity of a close geographical connection between the producing 
plant and the land of the consumer further distinguishes public utilities from totally private 
natural monopolies. The most efficient service can only be achieved, therefore, by allowing 
one company to provide all the electricity in an area. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUB­
LIC UTILITY RATES 7-17 (1961). 
18. 	 R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 15, at 3-4, 13. 
19. See C. PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 63-65. Although most theorists concede that 
other sources of energy such as gas or wood subject electricity to some competition, 
"neither the oil lamp nor the Welsbach gas mantle can seriously rival electric lighting." 1 
A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 2 (1969). 
20. Protection of the company's status as a monopoly within a specific geographical 
area justifies the obligations. Thus, rate regulation substitutes for competition in the mar­
ketplace. See M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 16, at 28-29. 
21. 	 Id. at 21. See infra notes 71 & 109. 
22. 	 M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 16, at 21. 
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 76, 94 (West 1976 & West Supp. 1984). 
The Department's regulatory authority extends only to electric companies providing retail, 
intrastate service. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 1, 76 (West Supp. 1984). 
24. 	 R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 15, at 27. See, e.g., City of Boston v. Edison Elec. 
IlIum. Co. 	of Boston, 242 Mass. 305, 307, 136 N.E. 113, 115 (1922). 
A single static method cannot delineate a definition of the concept of reasonable rates. 
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process of determining just and reasonable rates involves the balancing 
of both consumer and investor interests.25 In pursuit of this somewhat 
vague objective, the law of regulatory rate approval has followed a 
traditional technique of analysis. 
B. Orthodox Rate Regulation Analysis 
Any regulatory rate decision ultimately seeks to set a level of rev­
enues for a particular company that reflects production expenses plus 
a reasonable profit. 26 Future rates are usually made solely with refer­
ence to the company's past activities and surrounding economic cir­
cumstances. Thus, the department adopts a test year27 as the 
parameter within which to set the value of four basic components used 
as tools to reach just and reasonable rates. 
First, the department ascertains the gross revenue of the company 
The factors considered and methods employed must change with the times. Federal Power 
Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,602 (1944). The most pervasive feature 
in the reasonableness determination is the cost of producing electricity. "Cost," as used in 
ratemaking, includes not only the company's out-of-pocket expenditures but also the 
amount it must pay investors to provide capita!. The latter element of "cost" compels the 
public official to allow the company an opportunity to earn a reasonable profit. J. BON­
BRIGHT, supra note 17, at 63-71. 
The inclusion of a profit component rests on the fourteenth amendment and equivalent 
due process guarantees in all state constitutions that prevent confiscation of private prop­
erty. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n of W. Va., 262 
U.S. 679, 690 (1923). See also MASS. CONST. Pt. I, arts. I, 10 & 12. See, e.g., Fitchburg Gas 
& Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 371 Mass. 881, 884, 359 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 
(1977). See generally Dakin, The Changing Nature of Utility Rate Regulation: Just Com­
pensation, Due Process and Equal Protection, 36 TuL. L. REV. 401 (1962). In order to 
support a charge of confiscation a company must show that the department's decision de­
prives it of an opportunity to recover the costs of providing electricity and a reasonable 
profit. Massachusetts Elec. CO. V. Department of Pub. Uti!., 376 Mass. 294, 298-99, 381 
N.E.2d 325, 328-29 (1978). Under the constitutional mandate, the company may challenge 
the Department's definition and valuation of the concepts used in a particular rate proceed­
ing. The overall qualifier of "just and reasonable," therefore, provides department control 
over monopoly pricing yet enables the company to provide adequate service. 
25. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,603 (1944). In 
the broad area of rate determination, the investors are interested in deriving income from 
the rates and having the company maintained as a stable business. The consumers desire 
the minimization of rates and an adequate supply of electricity. The latter consumer inter­
est mayor may not dovetail with the investors' interest in the company's financial integrity. 
See J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 17, at 38. 
26. See supra note 24. 
27. The Department usually chooses the most recent twelve month period preceed­
ing its rate investigation as the test year. The department bases all its decisions concerning 
future rates on the company's activities during this period. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 
IS, at 27. 
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during the test year.28 The department eventually compares the gross 
revenue to the other three components to determine whether it is equal 
to the rate level which should have been earned as costs of service and 
profit. The second component, operating expenses, generally accounts 
for the company's out-of-pocket expenditures which represent the cost 
of providing service.29 The interaction of the third and fourth compo­
nents of ratemaking analysis, rate base and rate of return, establish a 
reasonable margin of profit.30 The rate base comprises the amount of 
capital invested in facilities that were used and useful in providing 
electricity during the test year. When multiplied by the rate of return, 
it yields the amount of allowable profit. 3I 
Since the rate base has a fixed definition changing only with in­
vestment activities producing tangible electricity service, the depart­
ment varies the rate of return to reflect the economic situation during 
the test period. Two factors designed to allow an economically rea­
sonable profit margin, therefore, determine the rate of return.32 First, 
under the objective of just compensation for assets dedicated to the 
public,33 the department considers the amount of profit which other 
businesses of comparable risk earn.34 Second, the department ascer­
tains the rate of return which the company must pay its investors to 
28. More specifically, gross revenue is the total amount received directly from the 
consumers during a twelve month period. I A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 45. 
29. I A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at so. The major portion of operating expenses are 
directly connected with the production of electricity distributed during the test period. 
This concept, however, also includes amortization of the investment in property previously 
acquired and currently providing service. In Massachusetts, the Department has allowed 
charitable contributions and advertising expenditures as operating expenses as long as they 
are reasonable and benefit the company's business. American Hoech~st Corp. v. Depart­
ment of Pub. Util., 379 Mass. 408, 413, 399 N.E.2d 1,4-5 (1980); New England Tel. and 
Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443, 482-90, 275 N.E.2d 493, 517-21 
(1971)(advertising and charitable expenditures are legitimate expenses of a business). The 
General Court has recently limited a company's recovery of advertising expenditures, 
seemingly overuling New England Tel. and Tel. Co., based on the content and goals of its 
advertising. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 33A (West Supp. 1984) (enacted in 1981). 
30. R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note IS, at 27. 
31. I A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 139-42. 
A trend among commentators on ratemaking exists favoring replacement of the bifur­
cated system of reference to a rate base and a rate of return with one relying exclusively 
upon the reasonableness requirement established in constitutional guidelines and economic 
principles. Thus, the amount of profit should be sufficient "to maintain confidence in the 
financial integrity of the enterprise; to maintain the credit of the enterprise; and to attract 
capital to the enterprise." Foster, Fair Return Criteria and Estimation, 28 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 883, 885 (1976). 
32. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 16, at 118-19. 
33. See supra note 24. 
34. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n of W. Va., 
262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923). See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 
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maintain a continuing source of capital to accomplish its obligation of 
adequate service.3s 
After gross revenues, operating expenses, the rate base, and the 
rate of return have been established, the department adds the operat­
ing expenses to the allowed return, computed by multiplying the rate 
base by the rate of return, to determine the company's revenue re­
quirement for the test year. If the revenue requirement exceeds the 
gross revenues collected during the test year, then the department in­
creases the total amount recoverable from consumers by an amount 
equa. to the deficiency.36 
C. 	 Rate Regulation After the Abandonment of a Nuclear Power 
Plant Prior to Completion 
1. 	 Application of Regulatory Concepts to Account for 
Recovery of Abandonment Losses 
Regulatory agencies in several states have allowed public utilities 
to recover the costs of abandoned projects. 37 These regulatory agen­
cies followed the basic ratemaking methodology, but they diverged 
into two methods of accounting for the costs: -increasing the rate of 
return or allowing an addition to operating expenses. 
In Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission v. Pacific 
Power & Light Co., 38 the electric company sought to recover the share 
of its investment in two jointly owned, prudently abandoned39 nuclear 
power plant projects allocated to its service area in Washington. In 
response to the company's request, the Washington Utilities & Trans­
portation Commission (Commission) increased the rate of return.40 
Thus, the Commission allowed the company to recover its expendi­
tures by increased rates through an increase in the allowed return.41 
The Commission reasoned that the rate of return could act as an ap­
propriate category in which to reflect the abandonment losses because 
investors would perceive that the company had become a higher risk 
investment. As a result, the company would have to pay larger divi­
320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 376 Mass. 
294, 300, 381 N.E.2d 325, 329 (1978). 
35. See Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti!., 376 Mass. 294, 299­
300,381 N.E.2d 325, 329-30 (1978). See generally I A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 191-94. 
36. 	 P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 44-45 (1964). 
37. 	 390 Mass. at 224 n.lO, 455 N.E.2d at 422-23 n.lO. 
38. 	 51 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 158 (Wash. Uti!. & Transp. Comm'n 1983). 
39. 	 See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text. 
40. 	 51 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 168. 
41. 	 See supra note 29 & 34 and accompanying text. 
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dends to attract capital in order to be able to perform its service obli­
gation. Since the rate of return is partially based on the company's 
cost of capital, losses which might cause a rise in this cost justified 
recovery by a higher rate of return.42 
Another method would allow the recovery of abandonment costs 
as operating expenses.43 The second treatment parallels the com­
pany's recovery of capital invested in new facilities through the 
mechanics of a depreciation expense while the facility generates elec­
tricity.44 If the planned facility were completed and were to begin ser­
vice, however, the company would be able to reflect its value in an 
increased rate base, thereby gaining an opportunity to earn a greater 
amount of profit.45 Thus, the "operating expense" method restores 
the amount invested and lost without allowing the company to profit 
on an investment that will never benefit the consumers.46 A majority 
of agencies allowing recovery for abandonment losses have used the 
"operating expense" method.47 
2. 	 Policy Rationales to Allow Recovery of Abandonment 
Costs 
Generally, decisions to allow recovery of abandonment costs stem 
from the view that the regulatory agency must balance the investor 
and the consumer interests in order to arrive at just and reasonable 
42. 	 51 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 168. 
43. In Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 109, 115 (N.J. Bd. of 
Pub. Util. 1983). 
44. 	 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 112-13. 
45. 	 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
46. See In Re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 503, 557 (Me. 
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982). 
47. In Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 4th (PUR) 109, 115 (N.J. Bd. of 
Pub. Uti I. 1983). Most, if not all, of the agencies which have allowed the company to 
recover abandonment losses from the ratepayers through the operating expense account 
have characterized the losses as flowing from an extraordinary property loss incurred in an 
effort to fulfill the "adequate service" obligation. See, e.g., In Re Rochester Gas & Elec. 
Corp., 45 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 386 (N.Y. Pub. Servo Comm'n 1982); In Re Virginia 
Elec. & Power Co., 29 PUb. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 65, 76 (Va. St. Corp. Comm'n 1979). 
They derive their characterization of the losses from the accounting regulations placed on 
interstate electric companies under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com­
mission (FERC). Cf Note, Allocation of the Risk of Constructing Electric Power Plants, 
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 517, 520-21. The regulations provide for an account that "shall in­
clude extraordinary losses on property abandoned or otherwise retired from service which 
are not provided for by the accumulated provisions for depreciation or amortization and 
which could not have been foreseen and provided for, and extraordinary losses.. . . which 
could not reasonably have been anticipated . ..." 18 C.F.R. § 101 (1983) (emphasis ad­
ded). The last condition embodies the prudence standard which almost all state agencies 
employ in allowing recovery. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
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rates.48 
In the question of who should pay the costs of abandonment, the 
ratepayers presumably desire not to pay for a facility that will never 
provide them with any service. One may further surmise that ratepay­
ers are also interested in adequate and economical service. To fulfill 
the latter interest, the company must plan49 to meet future electricity 
demands and other contingencies. Thus, expenditures in planning to 
build a facility based on projections in demand and forecasts of the 
availability of the company's raw materials correspond to the ratepay­
ers' interest, even though the company must later abandon the project 
prior to completion. The consumers' interest can be defined, there­
fore, as a desire not to pay for a company's waste or inefficiency. The 
investors' interest, on the other hand, lies in receiving the highest re­
turn possible on their capital investment and in maintaining the finan­
cial integrity of the company. Presumably, the ratepayers share in the 
latter of the investors' two interests. 50 
Considering the interests of the investors as well as those of the 
ratepayers, regulatory agencies have passed all or some of the losses on 
48. See, e.g., In Re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 4th 503, 556-57 (Me. 
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982); In Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 
109, 115 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. 1983); In Re Carolina Power and Light Co., 49 Pub. Uti I. 
Rep. 4th (PUR) 188, 216-17 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1982); In Re Central Vt. Public Servo 
Corp., 49 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 372,391-93 (Vt. Pub. Servo Bd. 1982); In Re Washing­
ton Util. & Transp. Comm'n V. Pacific Power & Light, 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 158, 
168 (Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm'n 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court originated the balancing viewpoint in a rate case not 
involving abandonment costs. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 
591 (1944). The Court reviewed the Federal Power Commission's decision to reduce the 
rate level recoverable by the company from its customers. Id. at 593. The Court held that 
"it is the result reached not the methods employed which is controlling" on the issue of 
whether rates are just and reasonable. Id. at 602. In sustaining the Commission's deci­
sions, moreover, the Court concluded that the ratemaking process as a whole "involves a 
balancing of the investor and the consumer interests." Id. at 603. The Commission satis­
fied the Court's balancing process when it arrived at a rate level sufficient to give the com­
pany enough revenue for the capital costs of the business as well as for operating expenses. 
Id. Consistent with its adoption of a fact-based balancing test, the Court affirmed the 
agency's decision without judging the propriety of the particular methods the commission 
employed in determining the value of the company's rate base and rate of return. Id. at 
605-06. 
49. As of November 2, 1982, a majority of voters state wide must approve each pro­
posed nuclear power plant project as part of a company's plan to build. MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 164 app., § 3-3 (West Supp. 1984). See infra notes 123-126 and accompanying 
text for another restraint on a company's plan. 
50. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 453-55 (Mass. 
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982); Stewart, A Bankrupt Utility - What If?, 112 PUB. UTIL. FORT., 
Sept. 15, 1983, at IS, 17. See also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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to the ratepayers. The agencies rest their "sharing of loss" approach51 
on a recognition of the company's legal obligation to add capacity to 
provide adequate service or produce electricity in the most efficient 
manner. 52 Permitting recovery, agencies have used two main theories. 
The first holds that the investors have not previously been compen­
sated for the risk inherent in the construction of a nuclear plant. The 
second measures the extent to which the company's management 
could not reasonably foresee the loss. Although other policies may be 
elucidated to support a recovery of prudent investments in new facili­
ties that are never completed,53 the above two theories are the most 
common. 54 
The risk compensation theory requires an investigation of 
whether the investors previously received compensation for the risk of 
non-completion. Thus, the inquiry focuses primarily on the rate of 
return allowed in the past. The risk for the company of the abandon­
ment and loss of the investment would have to be ascertained accord­
ing to the characteristics of the project undertaken and the prior 
experience of businesses undertaking similar projects. 55 Since inves­
tors require a direct relationship between the risk of loss and the 
amount of dividends,56 the regulatory agency would then have to cal­
culate the appropriate rate of return to compensate an investor for 
bearing the ascertained risk. Finally, the appropriate rate of return 
would be compared to the actual rate of return effective prior to aban­
donment. If the actual rate is lower than the projected rate, then the 
regulatory agency would pass the loss sustained by the cancellation on 
to the ratepayers. 57 
51. See, e.g., In Re Atlantic City Elec. Co., 51 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 109, 115 
(N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. 1983). 
52. See generally Sommers, Recovery ofElectric Utility Losses from Abandoned Con­
struction Projects, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 363 (1982).· 
53. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
54. Note, A New Approach to Allocating Financial Responsibility for Cancelled Nu­
clear Units - Consumers' Counsel v. Public Utility Commission of Ohio, 13 U. ToL. L. 
REV. 1469, 1475-81 (1982). 
55. Note, Allocation of the Risk of Constructing Electric Power Plants, 1976 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 517, 525. 
56. K. BOUDREAUX & H. LoNG, THE BASIC THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 54 
(1977). 
57. See, e.g., In Re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 503, 557 
(Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1982); In Re Central Vt. Public Servo Corp., 49 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 
4th (PUR) 372, 391-92 (Vt. Pub. Servo Bd. 1982); Washington Uti I. & Transp. Comm'n v. 
Pacific Power & Light Co., 51 Pub. Uti I. Rep. 4th (PUR) 158, 168 (Wash. Util. & Transp. 
Comm'n 1983). The regulatory agencies have derived the risk compensation mode of anal­
ysis from their treatment of undepreciated investment in retired facilities which companies 
have been allowed to recover from the ratepayers. Note, Accounting for Extraordinary 
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Total reliance upon the risk compensation method, however, may 
lead to an inequitable apportionment of the loss. First, it ignores the 
question of whether the company's management instituted and pur­
sued the project in a prudent manner.58 Since ratepayers 59 have less 
control than investors over management decisions,6O the investors 
should be charged with losses sustained as a result of imprudent man­
agement. 61 Secondly, the two components of the theory - risk of loss 
and the appropriate return which would compensate for it - would be 
difficult to ascertain after the loss had occurred.62 
The other common rationale considers whether the company's 
managers foresaw or should have foreseen the cancellation.63 If the 
investment loss did not become apparent until the time the company 
decided to abandon it, the regulatory agencies have held that the com­
pany made prudent decisions to continue. Thus, the test under the 
second rationale asks whether the negative events64 surrounding the 
Obsolescence, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1431 (1952). See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. 
Baker, 188 F.2d II, 19-20 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 952 (1951) (policy of risk 
compensation may allow inclusion of prematurely retired plant in rate base, but the rate of 
return must be reduced concomitantly). 
58. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
59. The ratepayers' input into management decisions concerning construction is non­
existent because they are relegated solely to control through the regulatory agency's 
ratemaking authority. City of Boston v. Edison Elec. IlIum. Co. of Boston, 242 Mass. 305, 
310-14, 136 N.E. 113, 116-17 (1922). Cj E. BERLIN, C. CiCHEITI & W. GILLEN, PER­
SPECTIVES ON POWER 91 (1975) (even if citizens may participate in licensing proceedings 
any input arrives too late because growth determination will have already been made) 
[hereinafter cited as E. BERLIN]. 
60. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 16, at 95. 
61. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 461 (Mass. 
Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982). 
62. Note, supra note 54, at 1481. The risk of loss approach, furthermore, fails to 
recognize that the company is only entitled to an overall rate level which allows an opportu­
nity to recover the costs of providing electricity and a reasonable profit. See supra note 24 
and accompanying text. 
63. See In Re Detroit Edison Co., NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 20,035, at 16,223­
24 (Mich. Pub. Servo Comm'n July 26, 1976). 
64. The events which have made abandonment a more frequent occurrence in recent 
years include the rapidly increasing costs of building nuclear power facilities which must be 
funded through capital attraction, the difficulties in engineering design due to environmen­
tal and health concerns, and the unprecedented negative demand response to a rise in the 
cost of oil for the production of electricity. Allison, Judging the Prudence of Constructing 
Nuclear Power Plants: A Report to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 15 TULSA L.J. 
262, 267 (1980). For example, authorities have cited two factors as the major causes of 
cancellation; the moratorium on licensing of construction as a result of the Three Mile 
Island accident and the upwardly spiraling cost of construction. See Sommers, Recovery of 
Electric Utility Losses From Abandoned Construction Projects, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
363, 364 (1982); Note, Who Shall Bear the Cost ofAbandonment, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 91, 
91-92 (1981). Cj Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 82 (other major causes 
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project made its initiation or continuation imprudent. The line is 
drawn by looking at whether the management's decisions were reason­
able at the time considering the circumstances under which they were 
made. The agencies allow the company to recover all costs prudently 
incurred from the ratepayers.65 
ANALYSIS 
A. 	 Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities'Decision to Allow 
Boston Edison to Recover Part of its Investment in Pilgrim II 
In the regulatory rate proceeding which gave rise to Attorney 
General, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities noted that 
the losses on Pilgrim II were the largest to date nationwide and that its 
task was to achieve balance between consumer and investor interests.66 
Returning to the basic attributes of public utility business and regula­
tory control,67 the Department identified three essential components: 
the obligation of the company to provide adequate service; the neces­
sity of regulatory price control; and a public obligation to support the 
financial integrity of the company that provides service.68 The De­
partment determined that the components compelled sharing the 
losses of Pilgrim II's cancellation.69 
In order to support further the contention that the losses had to 
be shared, the Department engaged in a psuedo-risk compensation 
analysis.70 It reasoned that the cancellation of Pilgrim II constituted 
an "extraordinary risk" legitimately undertaken by the company to 
replace its dependence upon the unpredictable supply of oiU! The 
of cancellation include disregard of cost effectiveness, poor conventional construction 
methods, and inadequate management controls over construction progress). 
Arguably, the companies should have foreseen these events, especially the engineering 
problems during construction, and resolved them at the stage of an initial decision on the 
viability of nuclear power. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text for a possible 
explanation of the company's refusal to confront potential problems with nuclear power 
plants. The recent multiplicity of nuclear power plant abandonments emphasizes the need 
for a reexamination of nuclear power in terms of its financial as well as environmental 
hazards. 
65. Note, supra note 54, at 1481. See Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Depart­
ment of Pub. Util., 371 Mass. 881, 882-84, 359 N.E.2d 1294, 1296-97 (1977). 
66. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 456 (Mass. Dep't of 
Pub. Util. 1982). See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
67. 	 See supra notes 15-35 and accompanying text. 
68. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 453-55 (Mass. 
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). 
69. 	 Id. at 460. 
70. 	 Id. at 457-60. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. 
71. A Department decision, rendered before cancellation, supplied the conclusion 
here that the company had legitimately undertaken the Pilgrim II project and, therefore, 
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Department defined "extraordinary risk" as one usually encountered 
only in enterprises that offer investors the possibility of receiving large 
dividends upon their investments. In public utility law, however, reg­
ulatory price control serves to limit the amount of dividends which a 
public utility may distribute to its investors.72 Thus, the Department 
the unforeseen risk component embodied in it. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. 
Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 437 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). In 1979, Edison's request for 
rate increases totaling $200 million spurred the Department to investigate the Pilgrim II 
construction project. See Boston Edison Co., D.P.U. Order No. 19494, at 5 (Mass. Dep't 
of Pub. Util. Sept. 22, 1981). The investigation included an examination of "future demand 
for electricity in the company's service territory, the appropriate level of reserve [electric 
production] capacity, and alternatives to the [Pilgrim II] construction program." In Re 
Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 433 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 
1982). Despite the seemingly large scope of the 1979 investigation, the Department de­
clined to consider Edison's ability to finance the project to completion. Id. at 436. On 
September 22, 1981, one day before the company cancelled Pilgrim II, the Department 
issued its decision regarding justification of the project: 
The results clearly show the economic benefits of Pilgrim II. Just one year 
after the unit is placed in service its annual fuel savings exceed its total costs. By 
1994, Pilgrim II would save ratepayers nearly $660 million in power costs, and 
that amount will continue to increase into the future. 
We must emphasize that we do not rely solely on mechanical computations 
to reach this result. Indeed, we acknowledge that the many calculations included 
in this Order create a deceiving appearance of precision in an area fraught with 
uncertainty. 
Rather, this decision represents a careful review of the record and a reasoned 
judgment about the prudence of the Company's current construction program. 
Despite the significant risks inherent in that undertaking, the consequences of 
continuing our present dependence on imported oil are far less acceptable. In the 
midst of all the uncertainty surrounding the issues in this case, the one develop­
ment which we consider to be most likely is that the price of oil will continue to 
escalate at a rapid pace. We find it extremely difficult to overstate the problems 
associated with the Company's principal dependence upon a commodity which in 
eight years has increased in price in excess of 700 percent. Moreover, there is 
also considerable reason to doubt the reliability of oil supplies in the coming 
decade. The very real possibility of interruption of foreign-dominated supplies 
should be enough to mandate a policy of displacing oil-fired generation. Depen­
dence which is so vulnerable to disruption places all domestic users in a precari­
ous posture which is definitely contrary to state and national interests. 
Accordingly, it is an inescapable conclusion from this proceeding that oil, the 
Company's largest existing source of electric generation, is no longer an accepta­
ble option. We have also determined that nuclear power, despite its recent 
problems, is most likely to be the least expensive generation alternative available 
to the Company. 
It is these two conclusions that compel a finding that the Company's genera­
tion construction program is reasonable. 
Boston Edison Co., D.P.U. Order No. 19494, at 190-91 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. Sept. 22, 
1981) (footnotes omitted). The record of the investigation closed in February 1980. 390 
Mass. at 230, 455 N.E.2d at 426. 
72. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text. 
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concluded that Edison's investors had not been compensated for the 
risk of non-completion of Pilgrim 11.73 
The Department's analysis reflects a conclusory treatment of the 
risk compensation theory based on general notions of public utility 
economics and on the finding that the company's ability to provide 
adequate service in the future would be impaired if the ratepayers did 
not share the losses.74 
Instead of relying completely upon its risk compensation analysis, 
the Department proceeded to apply a prudence standard75 to Edison's 
actions throughout the project's life. It placed the burden on Edison 
to show that the need for the nuclear facility 76 and the ability to fi­
nance it sufficiently justified the decision to continue at various 
times.77 Thus, the Department drew the line on sharing the losses by 
excluding those incurred after the level of risk had become unaccept­
ably high and after the company's managers should have recognized 
it. 78 Under its second analysis, the Department used the rationale of 
73. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 458-60 (Mass. 
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). Cf Robinson, Utility Fiascoes - Who Should Pay?, PUB. UTIL. 
FORT., Dec. 17, 1981, at 17, 18 (1981) (arguing that investors buy public utility stocks for 
the prospect of a return on their investment and not for a specific amount of the return if 
the prospect is realized and that the risk consists of abandonment accompanied by regula­
tory disallowance of recovery). 
The need to compensate investors for their initial contributions of capital rested on the 
theory that otherwise the company would fail. See Stewart, supra note 50, at 15-17. Since 
public utilities compete for operating cash, which they later recover from the ratepayers, an 
inability to pay the amounts demanded for the use of money would destroy the company's 
ability to perform its service obligation. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 
(PUR) 431, 458-60 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). 
74. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431,458-60 (Mass. 
Dept of Pub. Util, 1982). One commissioner dissented. In his view, the investors could 
shoulder the whole Pilgrim II loss by using the company's retained earnings over several 
years. He characterized the basic finding of an inability to provide service without present 
recoupment of losses as a "smoke screen" produced by the company's "scare tactics." In 
Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 485-86 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. 
Util. 1982) (Commissioner Sprague, dissenting). 
75. The standard of scrutiny to which the Department held the company's managers 
was whether their decisions were reasonable "in light of all conditions and circumstances 
which were known at the time the decisions were made." In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. 
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 438 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). 
76. See supra note 71. 
77. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 436-38 (Mass. 
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). 
78. Id. at 470-12. The date on which Edison should have abandoned Pilgrim II was 
set at JUne, 1980. Id. at 470. The Department allowed recovery for all costs incurred prior 
to that date. In the Department's view, the recovery had to include a carrying charge, 
which essentially provides a percentage return on the balance of the loss to be recovered in 
future years. The justification held that all money prudently spent should have been reim­
bursed on the date of cancellation. Since immediate reimbursement would place an inordi­
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foreseeability of the loss to determine the amount each group would 
pay. 
A third policy basis for allowing the losses from the cancellation 
of a prudently maintained nuclear plant project appears in the Depart­
ment's reasoning. If the Department does not allow an electric utility 
to recoup its losses, then potential investors would demand higher div­
idends than the company, under regulatory restraint, would be able to 
pay. Even though the company might not reach bankruptcy, the nec­
essary capital to implement new technologies in the production of 
electricity would be unavailable.79 Consumers would also suffer be­
cause they would be at the mercy of future events affecting the re­
source presently used to produce electricity. so 
B. Attorney General v. Department of Public Utilities 
In Attorney General v. Department ofPublic Utilities, the supreme 
judicial court ratified the reasoning of the Department and its alloca­
tion of the losses between the ratepayers and the investors. s1 The anal­
ysis supporting the conclusion revolved primarily around the policy­
making authority which the legislature left to the Department by stat­
ute and the court's exercise of judicial restraint in light of the statutory 
nate burden on the ratepayers, repayment was scheduled into the future. In order to 
compensate for the time value of money, the Department applied a carrying charge. Id. at 
473. Compare Pacific Power & Light Co., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 23,974 (Mont. Pub. Servo 
Comm'n Apr. 19, 1983) (stating that application of a carrying charge to any allowed costs 
would result in a more beneficial treatment of the costs than if the utility completed the 
project). Other state regulatory agencies have also split the losses on a prudence/impru­
dence standard but denied the investors any compensation for recovery of the investment 
over a period of time. See, e.g., In Re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th 
(PUR) 503, 557 (Me. Pub. Uti!. Comm'n 1982); In Re Central Vt. Public Servo Corp., 49 
Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 372, 391-92 (Vt. Pub. Servo Bd. 1982); In Re Northern States 
Power Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 110, 116 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n 1981). In 
Massachusetts, the Department compromised by allowing carrying charge treatment of 
only the non-equity portion of the capital prudently invested in Pilgrim II. In excluding 
the equity portion, the Department noted that the equity investors possessed voting rights 
to control management efficiency and that they could not expect a guaranteed profit on 
their investment. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 471-73 
(Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti!. 1982). 
79. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 PUb. Uti!. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431,475 (Mass. Dep't of 
Pub. Uti!. 1982). 
80. The Pilgrim II project represents the point nicely. Edison attempted to reduce 
dependence upon scarce and unreliable foreign oil by initiating the project. Id. at 448. 
Assuming that nuclear power was the best alternative to oil, Edison had as its overall 
objective to fulfill its obligation to respond to events making it uneconomical to rely on the 
supply of this raw material to maintain an adequate level of electricity. Id. at 459. 
81. 390 Mass. at 232,455 N.E.2d at 427. 
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scheme. 82 
1. 	 The Role of the Judiciary in Reviewing the Department's 
Prudency Determination 
The Attorney General waged an alternative attack on the propri­
ety of the recovery allowed by the Department. The appellant as­
sumed that the Department possessed the authority to consider 
allowance but argued that its determination of prudence was arbitrary 
and capricious. 83 
Under the Massachusetts State Administrative Procedure Act, 
the judiciary plays a restricted role in the review of administrative de­
cisions. 84 In public utility regulation, the supreme judicial court has 
reviewed the Department's factual findings only upon the company's 
showing that the Department reached a confiscatory decision. 85 Fur­
thermore, the arbitrary and capricious standard involves a test as to 
whether substantial evidence exists on the record to support the De­
partment's conclusions. 86 Since the Department examined and 
presented its reasoning in sustaining Edison's decisions at various 
points during the project's life, the supreme judicial court correctly 
concluded that it could not review the particularities of the Depart­
ment's judgment. The court thereby dismissed the challenge to the 
Department's determination of when the continuation became impru­
dent, in terms of financeability, to continue the Pilgrim II project. 87 In 
view of the statutory constraints on judicial review of the Department, 
the court's deference in this area could have been predicted. Thus, the 
only remaining question was whether the Department committed an 
error of law when it allowed any recovery on the Pilgrim II 
82. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 94 (West 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 30A, § 14 (West 1979). When examined in light of each other, the two statutes 
support the court's premises that (I) the Department possesses the authority to use policy 
to define "operating costs" and (2) the court is limited in its review of the Department's 
determination and must give deference to agency policy-making. Contra 390 Mass. at 241­
43, 455 N.E.2d at 432 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
83. Brief for Appellant at 34-62, Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. Util., 390 
Mass. 208,455 N.E.2d 414 (1983). 
84. 	 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § 14 (West 1979). 
85. See Massachusetts Elee. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 376 Mass. 294, 298-99 
& 298 n.2, 381 N.E.2d 325, 328-29 & 328 n.2 (1978). A charge of confiscation allows the 
court to review the factual findings in detail because the charge has Constitutional signifi­
cance. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
86. Boston Edison Co. v. Assessors of Watertown, 387 Mass. 298, 302-04, 439 
N.E.2d 763, 766 (1982). 
87. 	 390 Mass. at 228, 455 N.E.2d at 425. 
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investment. 88 
2. The Importance of the Statutory Scheme 
Regulatory agencies are creatures of state legislative action. Stat­
utes create them and enumerate their powers.89 Authorizing statutes 
that have very broad language, however, delegate policy-making au­
thority to the regulatory agencies.90 In Massachusetts, the legislature 
has given the Department broad authority to approve or modify pro­
posed increases in rates in accordance with its determination of the 
"public interest." The only affirmative requirements placed on the 
Department are procedural. When a company proposes any increase, 
the Department must hold a public hearing and notify the Attorney 
General.91 Conspicuously, the statute does not mention the ratemak­
ing concepts nor parameters by which the Department might be lim­
ited in considering the inclusion of any company expense.92 The 
88. See infra note 92. 
89. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 16, at 64. 
90. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 15, at 22-24. 
91. See supra note 3. 
92. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 94 (West 1976). The Department under 
its statutory authority has adopted the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Uniform 
System of Accounts for electric utilities with certain modifications. MASS. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 220, § 51.01 (1981). See supra note 47. The regulations impose a system of accounting 
on the companies within the Department's jurisdiction but remain silent on the issue of 
their use in the Department's ratemaking analysis. See MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 220, 
§ 51.00 (1981). 
The possibility of the Department committing an error of law by allowing recovery is 
restricted to a consideration of the scope of the Department's statutory authority to make 
policy, its possible Constitutional violations, or its action in spite of a lack of substantial 
evidence. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). Otherwise, "the courts 
would usurp . . . all discretionary action in the government and in effect would be di­
recting and supervising all branches." Public Servo Comm'n of Ind. V. City of Indianapolis, 
235 Ind. 70, 81, 131 N.E.2d 308, 312 (1956). The dissent in Attorney General attempted to 
find an error oflaw not based on the Department's policy judgments. Thus, Justice Liacos 
charges the Department with retroactive ratemaking. See 390 Mass. at 240-41, 455 N.E.2d 
at 431. The principle of non-retroactivity, however, does not apply to the regulatory 
agency's consideration of lawful rate revision. Cf City of Knoxville V. Knoxville Water 
Co., 212 U.S. I, 13-14 (1909) (affirming the regulatory agency's holding that a company 
cannot include depreciated plant values in the rate base so as to reflect an increase in the 
return because it was entitled to and failed to request sufficient rates for its output or capital 
costs in the past). Non-retroactivity serves to protect the presumptive legality of the rate 
level set by a regulatory agency and to assign to the utility the risk of loss stemming from 
the stay of a rate adjustment order. Boston Edison CO. V. Department of Pub. Util., 375 
Mass. 1,6, 375 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1978) (citing New England Tel. and Tel. CO. V. Public 
UtiI. Comm'n, 116 R.I. 356,387-94,358 A.2d I, 19-23 (1976», cerr. denied, 439 U.S. 921 
(1978). Thus, the principle seems limited to circumstances in which (I) a public utility 
seeks to obtain a larger increase in rates from the court than it would have if the regulatory 
agency had granted its request for rate revision; or (2) the regulatory agency seeks to revise 
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statutory scheme permitted the court to conclude that the legislature 
had delegated to the Department the policy decision of whether to 
include abandonment losses as a cost of public utility operations.93 
The statutory underpinnings94 of the outcome in Attorney Gen­
eral are even more apparent when compared to another judicial deci­
sion95 on the allowance of nuclear plant abandonment losses. In Office 
retroactively a previously ordered rate. See, e.g., Boston Edison Co. v. Department of Pub. 
Util., 375 Mass. 1,4-6,375 N.E.2d 305,311-12 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 921 (1978); 
City of Newton v. Department of Pub. Util., 367 Mass. 667, 679-80, 328 N.E.2d 885, 892­
93 (1975). Furthermore, if non-retroactivity were not restricted to its purposes, then the 
rule would destroy the test year method of determining just and reasonable rates. The test 
year method considers adequacy of past revenues when determining future rates. See supra 
note 27 and accompanying text. 
93. 390 Mass. at 227-28, 455 N.E.2d at 424-25. 
Despite the supreme judicial court's assertion that it has always deferred to the De­
partment in areas of policymaking, the court in New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Depart­
ment of Pub. Uti!. overruled the Department's disallowance of some charitable 
contributions which was based on the policy that they did not benefit the ratepayers. See 
New England Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443, 485, 275 
N.E.2d 493,518 (1971). See also supra note 29 (recent Massachusetts legislation appar­
ently overruling the court's decision in New England Tel. and Tel. Co. on the legitimacy of 
recovery of certain advertising expenditures). But see West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Uti I. 
Comm'n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 70 (1935). 
The last bastion of potential judicial interference in favor of ratepayers seems to be the 
court's requirement that the Department apply its policies and practices in a consistent 
manner. 390 Mass. at 222, 455 N.E.2d at 422. Compare Boston Edison Co. v. Department 
of Pub. Util., 375 Mass. I, 20-21, 375 N.E.2d 305, 319 (1978) (using the consistency rule to 
favor the company), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 921 (1978). Attorney General itself, however, 
illustrates an inconsistency between the Department's practice of denying recovery of capi­
tal expenditures until a project is completed, 390 Mass. at 219, 455 N.E.2d at 420; see New 
England Tel. and Tel. Co. V. Department of Pub. Util., 360 Mass. 443, 454-56, 275 N.E.2d 
493, 501 (1971), and its practice of allowing recovery of prudent capital expenditures in an 
abandoned project. 390 Mass. at 217,455 N.E.2d at 419. The judicially sanctioned incon­
sistency shows that the Department may not always mean what it says in public utility 
ratemaking. Instead of the fiat regulatory policy of non-recovery until completion, the 
court has clarified the Department's practice as no recovery until completion unless the 
project will never be completed. 
The two situations may be distinguished on three grounds. First, if the project is 
abandoned, then the company must risk a regulatory determination that the company was 
imprudent in some or all of its expenditures. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. 
Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 435, 437-38 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). Second, the equitable 
theory that present ratepayers should not be compelled to pay the costs of future service 
disappears when any possibility of completion evaporates. See supra note 13. Third, if the 
expenditures were recovered at the time they were made then methods of depreciation and 
the determination of the return allowed with reference to the rate base (plant used and 
useful minus depreciation allowed) would have to be dismantled. 
94. See Pacific Power & Light Co., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 23,974 (Mont. Pub. Servo 
Comm'n Apr. 19, 1983). 
95. Recently, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire responded to the state regula­
tory agency's question on its authority to allow recovery of Public Service Company of 
New Hampshire's Pilgrim II losses. Appeal of Public Servo Co. of N.H., - N.H. -, 480 
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of Consumer's Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,96 the 
Ohio Supreme Court reversed the public utility commission's decision 
to allow amortization of abandonment losses incurred by the Cleve­
land Electric Illuminating Company.97 The facts are almost identical 
to Attorney General.98 The Public Utilities Commission determined 
that the decisions to undertake the project as well as to cancel it were 
prudent.99 In Ohio, however, the statute incorporates the orthodox 
ratemaking formula loo and concepts. IOl More specifically, the statute 
defines "operating costs" as the "cost to the utility of rendering the 
public utility service for the test period ...."\02 Since the object of 
the investment sought to be recovered, the four abandoned nuclear 
projects, would never render service, the Ohio Supreme Court con­
cluded that the statute precluded a policy-based \03 decision that any 
abandonment costs fit within the category of operating costS.I04 Thus, 
the statutory bar against allocating abandonment costs precluded the 
commission from considering both the balance between the consumer 
A.2d 20 (1984). The court noted that the language of the New Hampshire authorizing 
statute denied the agency the discretion to allow recovery. Id. at -, 480 A.2d at 25. 
In Wisconsin Pub. Servo Corp. v. Public Servo Comm 'n of Wis., the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin reversed and remanded the Commission's disallowance of abandonment losses 
because the policy reasons underlying the regulatory decision did not have a rational basis. 
The court, however, refused to consider "whether prudent [nuclear power plant project] 
expenditures are always recoverable from ratepayers." Wisconsin Pub. Servo Corp. v. Pub­
lic Servo Comm'n of Wis., 109 Wis. 2d 256, -, 325 N.W.2d 867, 871 (1982). Compare 
NEPCO Mun. Rate Comm. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 668 F.2d 1327, 1342­
44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's decision to 
exclude abandonment costs from rate base; recovery of investment through amortization 
unchallenged). 
96. 67 Ohio St. 2d 153,423 N.E.2d 820 (1981), appeal dismissed sub nom Cleveland 
Elec. Illum. Co. v. Office of Consumers' Counsel, 455 U.S. 914 (1982). 
97. Id. at 168, 423 N.E.2d at 829. 
98. Id. at 154,423 N.E.2d at 821-22. In 1973, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Com­
pany (CEI) joined four other companies to construct four nuclear power plants because of a 
forecasted rise in future demand for electricity. The anticipated demand never developed. 
In January, 1980, the companies cancelled all four units. CEI asserted as causes licensing 
delays and the more stringent planning requirements following the Three Mile Island acci­
dent making the cost of completion too high. Id. at 53-54, 423 N.E.2d at 821. 
99. Id. at 162, 423 N.E.2d at 826. The Commission noted that the best data avail­
able justified the decision to construct the four units. It also concluded that the decision to 
terminate was reasonable because of the "intervening decline in the growth [of demand for 
electricity] and the uncertainties which now attend the construction of nuclear units." Id. 
lDO. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text. 
101. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4909.151, 4909.15 (Page 1977 & Page Supp. 1983). 
102. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4909.15 (Page Supp. 1983). 
103. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
104. 67 Ohio St. 2d at 166-67, 423 N.E.2d at 828-29. 
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and the investor interests lOS and the effect of non-recovery on the com­
pany's ability to provide service. 106 
A comparison of the Ohio decision with Attorney General shows 
that the extent of the regulatory agency's policy-making authority de­
termines whether ratepayers maylO7 be directly charged with abandon­
ment losses. The loose statutory scheme in Massachusetts is 
preferable because it is more consistent with the legal obligation placed 
on the company to provide adequate service at reasonable rates.108 By 
allowing the department to draw the line of recovery at the company's 
imprudent actions, the regulatory agency can support the utility in its 
prudent endeavors to provide adequate and more efficient service. In 
contrast, the Ohio model may preclude the electric company from re­
sponding to the realities of the public utility business. 109 
C. Implications 
The broad statutory authority given to the Department 110 and 
defensible public policy rationales III justify the decisions of the De­
partment and the supreme judicial court. In present times, a statutory 
scheme that authorizes the Department to balance consumer and in­
vestor interests in each case serves better than a rigid statutory man­
date by defining ratemaking. 112 Problems exist, however, under the 
Massachusetts statutory scheme. Attorney General may result in a re­
flection of imprudent costs of abandonment in the rates even though 
105. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. See also infra note 109 and ac­
companying text. 
106. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Locher noted that the losses sustained 
by the company were not significant and could not reasonably be expected to impair the 
company's ability to render service. 67 Ohio St. 2d at 171,423 N.E.2d at 831 (Locher, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Compare Attorney Gen. v. Department of Pub. 
Util., 390 Mass. at 243-44, 455 N.E.2d at 433 (Liacos, J., dissenting). 
107. Of course, even if the regulatory agency operates under a loose statutory 
scheme, it may deny all the abandonment costs. Its decision may be based either on a 
determination that the company imprudently initiated the project, see Attorney General, 
390 Mass. at 229 n. 16,455 N.E.2d at 425 n.16., or on a policy decision that it is unfair to 
charge ratepayers for investments which unforeseeably go awry before completion. See In 
Re Pacific Power & Light Co., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 23,974 (Mont. Pub. Servo Comm'n 
Apr. 19, 1983). 
108. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
109. The law places an obligation on the public utility to provide adequate service 
regardless of events such as the 1973 oil embargo and its aftermath. If the company cannot 
respond to events by building facilities that employ new sources of energy, then the service 
obligation will not be met. See Stewart, supra note 50, at 15-17. 
110. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text. 
Ill. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra note III and accompanying text. 
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the agency officially placed them on the company.l13 According to the 
rate of return analysis, the cost of attracting investment monies consti­
tutes a major consideration in determining the appropriate rate of re­
turn. 114 In Attorney General, the investors were not fully compensated 
for the risk of cancellation because they had to bear the costs of the 
company's imprudent decision to continue the Pilgrim II project past 
July 1980. 115 Thus, future investors will demand a higher return on 
their investment because they now know they will be held responsible 
for management's imprudent decisions. In turn, the company will pro­
pose an increase in its rate of return claiming higher capital costs. Un­
less the Department recognizes the source of the claim, it may 
unwittingly allow the increase. 116 A portion of the imprudently in­
curred costs may then flow through to ratepayers. 
Recently, disallowed costs of an abandoned nuclear unit have, in 
the manner described above, indirectly fallen upon consumers in Ohio. 
On April 13, 1983, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Ohio Public 
Utility Commision's (PUC) decision to increase Cleveland Electric Il­
luminating Company's (CEI) rate of return from 17.02 to 17.30 per­
cent. 117 The PUC based its approval in part on an increase in CEl's 
increased cost of capital. I IS The PUC noted that CEl's cost of capital 
had risen during the test year because of an "increase in investors' 
113. See Allison, supra note 64, at 286. 
114. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 19, at 199-202. See supra note 35 and accompanying 
text. 
115. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 455-59, 472 
(Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). 
116. See Allison, supra note 64, at 298. Although the increased financing costs are 
less than the amount invested and lost, the regulatory agency's allowance of an increase in 
the rate of return under this scenario permits a permanent increase in the company's reve­
nue requirement. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text. 
Even if the Department recognized the source of the request, the possibility of charges 
of confiscation may compel it to allow an increase. See supra note 24 and accompanying 
text. In the original Ohio case, however, in which the court disallowed direct recovery of 
abandonment costs, the United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on the ground 
that the case did not present a proper federal question. Cleveland Elec. IlIum. Co. v. Office 
of Consumers' Counsel, 455 U.S. 914 (1982). The Court's action may imply that the disal­
lowance of abandonment costs, at least under the facts of Consumers' Counsel, does not 
constitute confiscation in violation of the Constitution. But see Wilson, Ratemaking Treat­
ment of Abandoned Generating Plant Losses, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 343, 359-60 
(1982). Consequently, Edison might have difficulty distinguishing between non-recovery of 
imprudent costs characterized as rate of return and those characterized as operating costs. 
See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text. 
117. Consumers' Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 4 Ohio St. 3d Ill, 114-15, 
447 N.E.2d 749, 753-54 (1983) (per curiam). 
118. Id. 
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percieved risk" 119 following the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to dis­
allow the cost of four abandoned nuclear units. 120 The Ohio Supreme 
Court acknowledged that, although the abandonment losses could not 
be characterized as operating expenses under Ohio law, the PUC 
could increase the company's rate of return based upon a factual find­
ing of higher capital costs in reality produced by the non-recovery of 
the losses. 121 The statutory bar against recovery for an investment that 
never rendered service, therefore, was ineffective in protecting the 
ratepayers. The same result may occur in the aftermath of Attorney 
General with respect to imprudently incurred costs of abandonment. 
Massachusetts now has legislation which moves toward prevent­
ing imprudent expenditures on a power plant that will never go into 
service. The particular legislation establishes an Energy Facility Siting 
Council (EFSC).122 It provides that, once every five years, each elec­
tric company must submit a long-range forecast predicting the needs 
of its service area and describing its plans to meet the demand, includ­
ing construction of new facilities. In addition, the company must up­
date its forecast with an annual supplemental report embracing any 
construction plans not embodied in previous forecasts. The agency 
may then approve or reject the long-range forecasts and any supple­
ments. 123 The electric utility need not present evidence of its ability to 
finance the inspection or completion of any projects. Furthermore, 
once the EFSC approves an initial plan for construction, its sanction 
for continuation of the project is not necessary. 124 Under the statutory 
framework, a state regulatory agency assumes a supervisory role over 
the company's initial determination of the "convenience and public 
necessity"125 of a proposed nuclear power plant and ongoing assess­
ment of its service area needs. The scheme at a minimum requires 
agency approval of plans to initiate a project and, therefore, evidences 
119. Id. at 114, 447 N.E.2d at 753. 
120. Id. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text. 
121. Consumers' Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 4 Ohio St. 3d Ill, 114-15, 
447 N.E.2d 749, 753-54 (1983) (per curiam). See also Note, Public Utilities: The Black Fox 
Nuclear Project Cancellation Dilemma: OfJudicial Review and Reform ofOklahoma's Ad­
ministrative Process, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 190, 228 (1983). 
122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69H (West 1976 & West Supp. 1984). The 
statute grants the EFSC the authority to oversee the public necessity and environmental 
aspects of an electric company's decision to add a new plant as well as to evaluate the 
adequacy of current service. Id. 
123. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 69I-69K (West Supp. 1984). 
124. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.I64, §§ 691-69J (West Supp. 1984). 
125. See Allison, supra note 64, at 286-98. 
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a greater ability to prevent imprudent costS.126 
Although the statute grants an early supervisory role over all 
projects planned after 1976,127 determination of forecasted need may 
not suffice to eliminate imprudent decisions especially concerning nu­
clear power facilities. Public utility managers have an economic incen­
tive to prolong nuclear plant investment beyond the date of 
imprudency in terms of ability to finance the project and continuing 
need for the additional capacity. In general, the construction of a nu­
clear power plant is capital intensive; 128 that is, huge amounts must be 
invested to construct the facility. Once it comes on line, however, the 
operating expenses are lower as compared to facilities which use other 
sources of energy. 129 Utility managers look with favor upon nuclear 
projects and may, therefore, continue to pursue completion impru­
dently because the large capital costs will be included in their rate base 
from which their profit will be computed. Thus, they achieve a greater 
profit by undertaking and continuing, at all costs, a project which will 
add relatively more to their rate base than other projects for which 
construction is cheaper but operating expenses are higher. l3O As Attor­
ney General illustrates, the need for the facility131 at or near its initia­
tion may not be dispositive of the prudence of its construction. Prior 
to Attorney General and the rate case which gave rise to it, the Depart­
ment did investigate the need for Pilgrin II. It refused, however, to 
126. Id. 
With respect to Attorney General, however, the supreme judicial court in Plymouth 
County Nuclear Information Comm. v. Energy Facilities Siting Council prevented the EFSC 
from exerting authority over Edison's decisions to continue the Pilgrim II project because it 
was under construction before the effective date of the legislation that created the EFSC. 
The court said that the term "construction," which makes a facility subject to the earliest 
possible regulatory supervision, should have the same meaning when used in connection 
with the grandfathering of Edison's plans to build Pilgrim II. Plymouth County Nuclear 
Information Comm. v. Energy Facilities Siting Council, 374 Mass. 236, 238-40, 372 N.E.2d 
229, 231-32 (1978). Thus, the court relegated the Attorney General situation to the pru­
dence/imprudence standard in order to protect the ratepayers. The Attorney General result 
is the second best alternative as long as the Department remains aware of the possibility 
that the company might attempt to recover a portion of the imprudent costs through claims 
for a higher rate of return. 
127. See supra note 126. 
128. E. BERLIN, supra note 59, at xiii. 
129. Allison, supra note 64, at 266. 
130. W. CAPRON, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 4-5 
(1971). 
131. The necessity of the facility, as determined in Attorney General and under the 
EFSC, rests on whether the plant should be added in response to higher demand, lack of 
sufficient reserve capacity, or displacement of oil as a resource. See In Re Boston Edison 
Co., 46 Pub. Uti\' Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 433 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Uti\' 1982); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 691-J (West Supp. 1984). 
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examine the company's ability to finance the project. 132 Later, the De­
partment drew the line of imprudency earlier than the actual cancella­
tion date even though the need for the facility may have continued. 133 
Thus, the sole cause of the imprudently incurred costs seems to have 
been the company's disregard in June, 1980, of the intolerably high 
risk that it would not be able to complete the project. 134 Conse­
quently, the legal system must force the company to become more re­
alistic in its overall decisions concerning continuation of a nuclear 
power plant project. 
In light of the incentive to continue a nuclear plant project be­
yond the point when it becomes imprudent and the realistic potential 
that imprudent expenditures will eventually be charged to ratepayers, 
the legislature should give the EFSC the power to examine periodi­
cally the company's ability to finance construction during the life of 
any nuclear plant project which it approves. Presently, the statute 
grants the EFSC such authority over any oil company135 planning to 
build a new oil facility at its initiation. 136 Since the EFSC is a separate 
agency unburdened with the ratemaking tasks of the Department, pro­
posed and ongoing nuclear plant projects should be made subject to 
the same type of scrutiny as oil facilities. The massive amounts of 
money required to build nuclear facilities justifies the intrusion of the 
EFSC assuming a periodic supervisory role during the project. 137 
132. In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 436-37 (Mass. 
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Subsequently, the 
supreme judicial court acknowledged as appropriate the Department's restriction of its 
scope of analysis during the life of the project as to the need and the relative cost of the 
facilities. The court based its conclusion on the judicially created presumption of manage­
ment's good faith in making decisions regarding the financeability of the project. 390 Mass. 
at 229, 455 N.E.2d at 428. 
133. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 451, 470 
(Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1982). See supra notes 71 & 78 and accompanying text. 
134. See In Re Boston Edison Co., 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 431, 470-71 (Mass. 
Dep't of PUb. Util. 1982). 
135. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69G (West 1976 & West Supp. 1984). 
136. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 691 (West Supp. 1984). 
137. See supra notes 113-121 & 128-134 and accompanying text. Periodic supervi­
sion, if granted by legislation, would not be in violation of any Constitutional provision. In 
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 108 (1908), the 
United States Supreme Court reviewed the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) or­
der preventing Great Western from raising its rates for a specified class of freight custom­
ers. Id. at 108-09. The Court reversed the ICC's order based partly on ICC's lack of 
authority to substitute its judgment for that of the company's managers. Id. at 118-23. 
Justice Brewer, writing for the Court, however, implied that the presumption of lawful and 
right action by the company might be "overthrown by any legislation in respect to common 
carriers." Id. at 120. Furthermore, the Court has recently stated that "Congress has left 
sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or 
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IV. CONCLUSION 

In recent years, a variety of different methods have developed to 
deal with the problem presented by the cancellation of nuclear power 
plant projects. 138 Each approach has its own implications for the con­
cerns of the ratepayers and the investors. The treatment may depend 
on a wide range of legal and economic concepts which inhere in the 
privately managed, publicly regulated utility industry. The statutory 
model of regulatory control in each state may tip the balance between 
partial or total recovery and disallowance of any recoupment. The 
inconsistency, however, between disallowance of prudently incurred 
costs of providing service and the legal mandate that the utility furnish 
adequate service at the lowest cost is apparent. On the other hand, an 
examination of management decisions regarding the initiation and 
continuation of a nuclear power plant project after the company has 
undertaken imprudent costs may not eliminate the flow-through of a 
portion of these losses to the ratepayer, even though investors are offi­
cially charged with them. Only legislation can prevent such a result. 
The model of regulatory control over nuclear projects must be revised. 
In nuclear power plant construction, price control is illusory if not 
coupled with supervisory authority during the life of the project. 
While some may balk at governmental examination of the manage­
ment affairs of the utility, periodic supervision over nuclear plant con­
struction would be advantageous. The prevention of imprudent costs 
would end the problem created by the conflict between encouraging 
efficient service and the indirect flow through of imprudent costs to 
ratepayers. 
Christine G. Brown 
even stopped for economic reasons." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,223 (1983) (Federal law did not preempt a 
Californian statute requiring state regulatory approval of a nuclear waste disposal plan 
prior to construction based on a concern for the likelihood of exorbitant cost of waste 
storage resulting in the eventual shutdown of a particular nuclear power plant). 
138. See supra notes 37-60 & 94-106 and accompanying text. 
